Journal of the Royal United
Service Institution
VOL. XIX. 1875. No. LXXX.
LECTURE.
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I
will say a word in conclusion which relates to what is
popularly called the Central Asian Question. Of the
cross-roads imperfectly shown in the map before you, I
think one of the most important is that which has Serakhs
for its centre. This place, if as well supplied with
water as its nearness to the Tejeiid leads us to suppose,
is of great value to Persia, and no pains or expense
should be spared to make it a strong outpost. Of course
there should be a capable Governor at Mash-had, and one
capable of dealing with the Turkmen
without room for interference by other and more powerful
Governments. But Serakhs is not the last or most remote
of the Persian outposts on the North East. Merv is hers also by
natural position, as should be the whole region of the
lower Murghab; unless, indeed, Afghanistan had been
powerful enough to have ruled the extreme valley of a
river which arises among her native mountains.
Whatever the geographical or scientific views on the
territorial dispositions of rivers, it should be a
universal, as it is a natural theory that the country in
which a river raises, and through which it runs its main
course, should not be cut off possession at its month.
The Danube does not offer a parallel case, for it passes
through many nationalities ; but let us take the Volga,
the Seine, the Dnieper, the Thames — the intrusions
of a foreign power at the embouchure of any of these, is
too impossible a contingency to contemplate for an
instant. The desert of Asia is not unlike the sea of
Europe; its extent and character constitute it an
admirable boundary between States; and the annexation by
Persia of the basin of the Helmand, when the whole rise
and progress of that river has been in Afghanistan, is
one of those results which political revolutions have
brought about in seeming opposition to the provisions of
nature. In like manner any attempt to annex Merv from the
Caspian, Aral, or Oxus, could only be instigated by
the ambition of barbarism or the recklessness of a wholly
selfish policy. Merv, if
not independent, or too far from the sources and
intermontane career of the Murghab to connect it with
Afghanistan, is clearly Persian and part of Khorasan.
As Herat is the supposed key to India, so Merv is the
supposed key to Herat. In considering the approach to
this quarter from the north, we must not forget the
present political as the permanent geographical situation
of Bukhara, a place from which there is also a road to Heratof
less than COO miles. Vambery
is an admirable referee on this subject, and should
be carefully studied by those interested. Both these roads cross
the Paropamisus, a barrier which should be an
efficient, as it is a natural one. That which I have had
the honor of detailing to you may not be impracticable to
artillery or any other arm with energy, ability, and will
to aid and direct ; but foreign invasion in these
countries is beset with difficulties, and it is a
question whether, upon the whole, they are not rather
increased than removed by civilization. Nadir Shah did not
march to India with modern
appliances, but neither had he, on the other hand,
the physical encumbrances or moral scruples that would
fall to the lot of existing commanders.1
1 If I have avoided expressing any more decided
political opinions on what may not inaptly be termed the
"question of the day," it is because such
expression might be here considered irrelevant or out of
place. At the same time, I would take the
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