BATTLE OF KALAN-CHIN-ALT
"7/a Chess player
lift his man without a definite purpose, he will
not conquer his opponent." Tae-Shuh-wan-
tsze.
"
That advantage in ground always is present upon
every field of battle which availed of renders
victory certain."
Prince Eugene.
This battle is one of the
most celebrated in Mongol history. The region
wherein it was fought is near modern Ourga,
between the Tula and Onon rivers. The mounds that
cover the slain are still shown to the tourist.
With the opening of spring in
the year 1203, Toghrul, khan of the Tribe of Ung,
King of the seventy tribes of Karaits and Khakan,
i.e., Emperor of the Mongols of Eastern
and Central Asia, convinced that Temudjin, later
known as Genghis Khan, who now ruled over forty
tribes of the Tartar peoples, was plotting to
overthrow his sovereignty; at the head of more
than 200,000 veteran troops marched from his camp
in the Black Forest on the banks of the Tula
river to attack the would-be usurper, who, with
about 120,000 men was strongly ensconced on the
northerly slope of the Mao range of mountains.
At
the approach of Ung Khan and his army, Temudjin
abandoned his camp, and retired to a position
among the Siludeljit hills, on the border of the Soyaldji
River, near the Khing-gan Mountains; posting a
strong advance guard upon Mt. Mundur-disku.
Ung Khan halted his army upon
the Nemudarend mountains, near Lake Kulum. Upon
this, Temudjin still further retired with his
army to a selected field for battle, near
Kalan-chin-Alt, within the Khing-gan range.
The battle field selected by
Temudjin was particularly adapted for the full
use and security of his numerically inferior
army. On both sides, inaccessible mountains made
the turning of his position, either by the right
or by the left impossible; His wings were covered
by almost perpendicular precipices, the level and
gradually descending terrain on his front,
afforded an ample and facile arena for the
evolutions of his veteran cavalry, the space
enclosed by the towering heights that
circumscribed his position was fitted to the size
of his army, and the open and easily accessible
country in his rear, gave full opportunity for
orderly withdrawal, should he choose to avoid an
encounter.
At
dawn the troops of Ung Khan advanced towards the
position occupied by Temudjin, and at sunrise,
the opposing armies stood
arranged in presence of each other. The Karaits,
equal in quality, outnumbered the troops of
Temudjin by two to one, for Ung Khan, well
knowing the vital importance of the stake at
issue, and the transcendent skill of Temudjin,
had assembled under the Royal Banner, the very
flower of the military strength of his dominions.
On
reconnoitering the hostile position, Ung Khan
said to his heir son Sengun:
"Temudjin
will now give us battle. He has led us to this
place for that purpose. Because of the mountains,
the precipices and the river, we neither can turn
his position nor outflank his army, and the
narrowness of the plain, enables him to oppose
any attack by us, an equal number of troops. His
men are fewer in number, but all are equal to
ours in valor and discipline, and although I am
an older soldier than Temudjin, I am not a
better. Nevertheless we shall win the victory,
inflict upon him a great defeat and destroy his
army.
"This
will happen because of Temudjin's error in
permitting the ground to fight for us. He cannot
retreat further, because another rearward
movement would discourage his troops. They would
think only of safety, and disordered and
confused, on debouching from the narrow denies
between the mountains, they would easily be
overwhelmed by our more numerous and exultant
cavalry.
"Therefore
he must fight, and he who is compelled to give
battle, always may be compelled to fight at a
great disadvantage. Temudjin desires, and it is
necessary for his success, that we attack him.
But this we will not do. As he cannot retreat, so
neither can he stay where he is, because his
horses will quickly eat up all the grass and he
dares not weaken his already lesser army by a
detachment numerous enough to gather forage.
Simply by waiting patiently, we compel him either
to retreat or to attack us, and if he attacks us,
he loses the advantages of his chosen ground and
gives battle with a smaller army to a
greater."
Intently
regarding the various deployments taking place
within the hostile lines, Ung Khan suddenly
continued:
"Temudjin
is losing no time. He is preparing to attack us.
He is massing his best troops on his right wing,
and his ablest officer, Kubuldar Sajin, at the
head of the Urats and Manhuts, will lead the
attack, which is to be against the left wing of
our army. These troops are so well trained that
they cannot be disordered. When they strike us,
you will see some dreadful fighting.
"Observe,
son, how I will cause the precipice which covers
our left flank, to destroy them."
By
the orders of Ung Khan, his lieutenants drew up
the Karait army as follows:
At
the foot of the slope of the hills of Gubtan,
fronting the hostile right wing, and extending
from the precipice which bounded the plain on the
Karait left, to the bank of the unfordable Lake Kulum,
on the Karait right, the first line of Ung Khan's
army was drawn up by squadrons, each nine ranks
deep.
In
rear of the left center was posted a division of
his best troops, the Julgyns, under their khan
Hadakji brother of Ung Khan, posted in double
column, by halfsquadrons of three ranks each, at
half-squadron distance. Behind these, half-way up
the slope of the hills, was drawn, up an equal
second line, and in the same formation; and in
rear of its left center, was similarly posted a
second division of picked troops, the Omans,
under their khan Achik-Shilun.
On
the crest of the hills was drawn up a third line,
of which the right wing and center was made up as
in the two preceding. But the left wing of this
third line differed from the two on its front, in
being composed of a third division of the best
Karait warriors, the Tungkaits.
In
rear of the Tungkaits, was drawn up in columns of
squadrons at full distance, the Royal Guards, all
men of the tribe of Ung, and all kinsmen by blood
to Ung Khan, under their commander, Shilaimun.
Temudjin,
having completed the deployment of his troops,
preparatory to the plan of attack selected, said
to his uncle Churchadai:
"I
would that thou begin the battle, and direct the
charge of my right wing against the hill of
Gubtan. What is thy wish?" But Kubuldar
Sajin interposed, and said:
"My
Manhut cavalry is in the van. It is my right to
lead them. Do not deny it to me, O, Khan."
Temudjin
said:
"Go
thou, and take Gubtan."
In
that order of battle originally formulated by
Epaminondas, and invariably adopted by Alexander,
Caesar, Prince Eugene and Frederic the Great in
like situations, and which later achieved the
transcendent victories of Leuthern, Mantinea,
Arbela, Issus, Hydaspes, Pharsalia,
Hohenfriedberg, Sohr, Rosbach, Leuthern and
Zorndorf, the troops of Temudjin's right wing
precipitated themselves upon the left of the army
of Ung Khan. Temudjin's heavily massed right
wing, led by Kubuldai Sajin, broke the Karait
first line, swept up the slope, over the second
line of Karaits, and then, with seemingly
irresistible energy and momentum, charged upwards
toward the crest of the hill of Gubtan, the
tactical key of the Karait position.
Before
the deluge of advancing cavalry, the Karait left
wing, composed of the Dungas, after rapidly
delivering volley after volley of arrows, with
the frightful effect, into the compact hostile
mass, suddenly, at the approach of the furiously
charging Manhuts, wheeled to the right; and
swiftly passing through the intervals between the
squadrons of Julgyn cavalry, drew up in lines of
squadrons, nine ranks deep, in their rear.
Thereupon, the Julgyns by a quarter wheel to the
right, formed in a double line by squadrons on
their front, and facing to the left, poured their
arrows into the flank of the Manhut cavalry.
Before
the continued advance of Kubuldai, the Karait
second line, composed of the Chor-Tremins,
executed a like evolution, and retired in rear of
the Omans, who in turn formed on their front, and
poured their arrows into the flank of the hostile
column.
Meanwhile,
the opposing centers, maintained with arrows and
javelins, a desultory skirmishing against each
other; while the right wing of the Karait army,
in more positive fashion pressed forcibly against
the weaker hostile left wing; which in this
battle formation, is refused and only brought
into action, either to render victory decisive or
to cover the retreat of the repulsed attacking
army.
The
massive column of Temudjin's right wing had
nearly reached the crest of Gubtan hill. Their
ranks were more or less disorganized. The arrows
of the Karaits had reduced their numbers by many
thousands. Their horses, wounded and exhausted,
and distressed by the rising ground, proceeded at
hardly more than a walk, and every moment men and
beasts fell by hundreds, before the rain of
missiles poured into them by the Julgyns and Omans,
lined up against their defenseless left flank.
Suddenly,
like a whirlwind, down upon them from the higher
ground, swept the Tungkaits and Ungs; men and
horses fresh and vigorous; his choicest and most
redoubtable warriors, reserved for this most
critical junction, by the sagacity of Ung Khan;
while simultaneously with this tremendous shock
against their front, the waiting Julgyns and
Omans hurled themselves against the unprotected
left Sank of the now staggering and almost
surrounded column.
But
the weapons of the Karaits hardly bore any
proportion to the destruction in Temudjin's army,
now caused by the excitement and confusion which
ensued in the unwieldy, uncontrollable and
panic-stricken mass, pent up between the lances
of the Ungs and Tungkaits in front, the swords of
the Julgyns and Omans on the left, and the awful
precipice on the right.
Surging
violently in all directions, each man possessed
of but the single thought of his own safety,
unable to turn their horses about, much less to
open out and deploy; men and beasts in a horrible
jam, by thousands were overthrown, trampled and
smothered by hoofs and dust, or slain by the
swords of their frantic comrades.
Gradually
the maddened multitude, all unconscious of the
terrible trap provided by the sagacity of Ung
Khan, was driven toward the precipice by the
Karait troops. First by scores, then by hundreds,
and finally, the choice warriors of Temudjins,
wild with terror, and in a fury of insanity
slaughtering each other, in the futile hope of
retaining a footing upon the plain, were crowded
by thousands over the brink, to their death in
the valley far below.
At
the sight of the terrible disaster to their right
wing, which was wholly made up of the best
officers and most formidable warriors of their
entire army, the hostile center and left wing
attempted to make an orderly retreat through the
great defile, into the plain beyond.
But
now what the sagacity of Ung Khan had foreseen
took place. Crowded together and butchered by
their merciless pursuers, the battle quickly
became nothing more than a process of
extermination of the defeated.
Finding
it impossible to rally even his few remaining
troops, Temudjin, with less than a score of his
adherents, took to flight and vanished into the
vast wastes of the Baljuna desert, leaving
Kubalbai Sajin and over 100,000 men and officers,
dead or dying, on the scene of his first and last
defeat.
Seeing that Temudjin was
beyond his reach, Ung Khan, with a great spoil of
arms, horses and prisoners, returned with his
army to his camp in the Black Forest. Then in
celebration of his victory, he erected the Great
Golden Tent, poles, cloths, furniture, dishes and
utensils of solid gold and for three months
feasted the Seventy Khans of the Karaits and his
allied Mongol Princes.
Young, Franklin Knowles. Chess
generalship, Volume 2, Part 1 International
publishing co., 1918