| THE TURKMEN Part 7 Turkmen Part 1 - Turkmen Part 2 - Turkmen Part 3 - Turkmen Part 4 - Turkmen Part 5 - Turkmen Part 6 - Turkmen Part 7 - Turkmen Part 8 - Turkmen Part 9 - Turkmen Part 10 - Turkmen Part 11 - Turkmen Part 12
Russians have been more vigilant in their efforts at
paralyzing the strength of the Turkmen
while the army from the Caspian was dealing a more direct
blow against them. It is doubtful whether the Teke
country can support its inhabitants, but considering the
wealth and fertility of the Murghab valley it would seem
as if they could disregard the cutting-off of their
source of supply to the north. For that reason it is
probable that there were other causes at work than those
which were accepted in Turkestan as the reason for the
Tekes becoming reconciled with the Persians.
It is most probable that the advance of General Lomakine
to Kizil Arvat and Beurma in the summer of 1877, and the
several defeats which he inflicted upon the Akhals,
caused great apprehension among the Tekes themselves.
That alarm would not be allayed by the subsequent retreat
of Lomakine, when the Akhals appear to have harassed his
retreating column very much, for the Tekes would well
know that the Russians would return and in greater force.
The Akhals could but very imperfectly ward off the blow
which Lomakine was evidently preparing for by frequent
visits to Tiflis, and if they were unable to fulfill
their part the brunt of the fray would devolve upon the
Tekes. In the winter of 1877 the return of Lomakine in
the coming spring was clearly foreseen by the Merv
chieftains, and it behooved them to decide what policy
they would adopt in their own defense. To them it was
evident that when the Russians returned it would be with
the full determination to establish themselves at Kizil
Arvat, if not in some more advanced position in the Akhal
country.
Brought face to face with so serious a danger, their old
antipathy for the Persian became a matter of secondary
importance, and the loss of their old marauding
privileges a thing of little moment. There was the
possibility of the Persian Government combining with the
Russian in revenge for past injuries, when the collapse
of the Turkmen
power must have been not only complete but immediate. The
Tekes were brought face to face with a double danger,
from Russian hostility and from Persian long-standing
indignation.
It was resolved in the council of the chiefs to avert the
latter by a timely surrender. The ruse, for such it was,
was successful. The Persian Government was delighted with
the sudden reformation of the Tekes, and hastily extended
that formal protection over the Turkmen
as its subjects to which attention has already been
called. It is probable that when the Shah welcomed back
his long- wandering subjects he did not consider the
wide-reaching consequences of his recognition of the Teke
country as being a portion of Persia.
When that arrangement was concluded it is doubtful
whether there was as clear a view at Teheran of the
importance of the Russian advance from Krasnovodsk as
there was at Merv. The Persian Government saw but the
fact that the Tekes wished to come to terms, and were
willing to give the long-coveted hold upon Merv, and it
did not delay its acceptance of the proposals so far as
to inquire into the motives which actuated the Tekes in
their unprecedented compliance with Persian desires.
Since Lomakine has re-appeared, and in greater force,
north of the Attock, and perhaps more particularly since
the erection of a fortification at the place known as
Chat, situated at the junction of the Sumbur and Atrek
rivers, it is conceivable that a different view of the
transaction is beginning to obtain at Teheran, where the
new obligations incurred by Persia towards the Turkmen
cannot be altogether ignored.
How Persia will consider herself bound to act in the
event of the Russian troops advancing on Khelat-i-Nadiri
is a very interesting question, but it cannot be answered
with any great confidence. The actual acquisition of
Sarakhs, the nominal authority to be exercised at Merv,
have both given Persia as much as she can reasonably
expect to secure from the Turkmen;
and in that quarter no defensive and offensive alliance
with Russia could give her more. Persia, having nothing
to hope, and everything to fear, from Russia in
Turkmenia, must be loath to assist Lomakine in any
movement against Merv, which is now, technically at
least, a Persian city. Sir Henry Rawlinson has declared,
in a paper on the road to Merv, lately read before the
Royal Geographical Society, that, with Persia hostile, an
advance of a Russian army from the south-east shores of
the Caspian upon Merv would be an impossibility ; and
unless Russian statesmen can dazzle the eyes of the
Shah's ministers by some more seductive picture, it would
appear that there is every reason for supposing that
Persia will not regard the development of Lomakine's
movement with anything but the greatest dislike. If such
be the prevailing sentiment in Teheran, we may look for
some interesting situations in the future stages of this
question, and we may possibly have some new versions of
the meaning of Persian citizenship.
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